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Abstract
Steemit is a blockchain-based social media platform, where
authors can get author rewards in the form of cryptocurren-
cies called STEEM and SBD (Steem Blockchain Dollars) if
their posts are upvoted. Interestingly, curators (or voters) can
also get rewards by voting others’ posts, which is called a cu-
ration reward. A reward is proportional to a curator’s STEEM
stakes. Throughout this process, Steemit hopes “good” con-
tent will be automatically discovered by users in a decentral-
ized way, which is known as the Proof-of-Brain (PoB). How-
ever, there are many bot accounts programmed to post au-
tomatically and get rewards, which discourages real human
users from creating good content. We call this type of bot a
posting bot. While there are many papers that studied bots on
traditional centralized social media platforms such as Face-
book and Twitter, we are the first to study posting bots on a
blockchain-based social media platform. Compared with the
bot detection on the usual social media platforms, the fea-
tures we created have an advantage that posting bots can be
detected without limiting the number or length of posts. We
can extract the features of posts by clustering distances be-
tween blog data or replies. These features are obtained from
the Minimum Average Cluster from Clustering Distance be-
tween Frequent words and Articles (MAC-CDFA), which is
not used in any of the previous social media research. Based
on the enriched features, we enhanced the quality of clas-
sification tasks. Comparing the F1-scores, the features we
created outperformed the features used for bot detection on
Facebook and Twitter.1
Introduction
Despite the interest in blockchain technology, the usage of
the so-called decentralized application (DApp) is still lim-
ited. Except for transferring and trading cryptocurrencies,
one of the most widely used applications is Steemit,2 a
blockchain-based social media platform. Based on a DApp
ranking site,3 Steemit had ranked first among all DApps for a
long time, and it still ranks sixth, and most DApps with high
∗Corresponding authors.
1This paper will appear in the proceedings of ICWSM 2021.
2https://steemit.com
3https://www.stateofthedapps.com
ranks are based on the Steem blockchain (Steemit 2017), on
which Steemit also runs.
On Steemit, authors get author rewards in the form
of cryptocurrencies called STEEM and SBD (Steem
Blockchain Dollars) if their posts are upvoted. Interestingly,
curators (or voters) also get rewards by voting others’ posts,
which is called a curation reward. A user is an author if
she writes a post, and is a curator if she votes a post (in-
cluding her own posts). Rewards are proportional to a cu-
rator’s staked amount of STEEMs, which is called STEEM
POWER.4 That is, an upvote from a user with more STEEM
POWER has a higher value. Each vote consumes a voting
power, which is regenerated as time goes by. There is also
a downvote which decreases the reward of a post, which
is intended to prevent spams and any malicious content.
Throughout this process, Steemit hopes “good” content to
be automatically discovered by users in a decentralized way,
which is called the Proof-of-Brain (PoB).
However, as on other traditional social media platforms
such as Facebook and Twitter, there are many bot accounts
that post automatically. We call this type of bot a posting bot.
Detection of posting bots may be more critical on Steemit
than other platforms, because posting bots on Steemit also
get rewards, which discourages real human users from cre-
ating good content. Due to downvoting, bots that spam fre-
quently cannot survive in terms of rewards. Therefore, post-
ing bots have evolved in a way that they can write more
meaningful posts hence appearing like human accounts.
There are many papers that studied bots on traditional so-
cial media platforms. In particular, some studies detected
posting bots on Twitter. Twitter is a microblogging site on
which users post messages called Tweets. A Tweet has a
140 (or 280 since November 2017) character limit. Thus,
a text in a tweet is short and relatively easy to analyze com-
pared with other social media platforms such as Facebook
and Steemit. On Steemit, there is no restriction on the length
of a post, but it is limited by the block size, which is cur-
rently 64KB. This is quite enough for most social media
posts.5 Another complication of detecting bots on Steemit
4Converting STEEM to STEEM POWER is instant, but the re-
verse takes 13 weeks.
5Any media files, e.g., pictures, videos, are uploaded to a tradi-
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is its high level of anonymity because of the decentralized
nature of blockchain. Due to its financial rewards, relatively
long texts, high level of anonymity, it is both important and
challenging to detect posting bots on Steemit.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to in-
vestigate posting bots on a blockchain-based social media
platform. Compared with the bot detection on the traditional
social media platforms, the features we created have an ad-
vantage that they can be obtained without limiting the num-
ber and length of posts. We extract the features by clustering
distance between the blog data or replies. These features are
obtained from the MAC-CDFA (Minimum Average Cluster
from Clustering Distance between Frequent words and Arti-
cles), which has not been used in any of the previous social
media research. This feature shows similarity between blog
data by clustering distances between blog data. Based on
the enriched features, we enhanced the classification quality.
Comparing the F1-scores, the features we created outper-
formed the features used for the bot detection on Facebook
and Twitter.
Related Work
Detecting bots on social media platforms has become an
important issue with the growth of social media platforms
(Allcott and Gentzkow 2017; Ferrara et al. 2016). Many re-
searchers have tried to detect bots with machine learning al-
gorithms (Abu-El-Rub and Mueen 2019; Chu et al. 2012;
Clark et al. 2016; Dickerson, Kagan, and Subrahmanian
2014; Santia, Mujib, and Williams 2019; Varol et al. 2017;
Wang 2010). They have focused on extracting features that
represent patterns of behavior of each account. In particu-
lar, features that represent the regularity have played a ma-
jor role. Some researchers computed the similarity of texts
posted by each user, and others measured an entropy of time
intervals to express regularity of behavior patterns. In a re-
cent study, (Li and Palanisamy 2019) pointed out the preva-
lence of a different type of bot from which users buy votes
on Steemit. Most of these bots are easily found from their
own advertisements or by examining transfer memos that
contain the post URL to be upvoted. In contrast, our focus is
a posting bot.
There have been several attempts to extract regularity of
texts, especially around Twitter (Abu-El-Rub and Mueen
2019; Clark et al. 2016; Wang 2010). They used a method
that considers all pairs of tweets, by defining the similarity
between two tweets. Similarity between two tweets is de-
fined in many ways. (Wang 2010) identified if a tweet is du-
plicated by another, using the Levenshtein distance. (Abu-
El-Rub and Mueen 2019) defined the similarity using the
Jaccard index of hashtags contained in each text. (Clark et
al. 2016) considered the longest common sequence of two
texts. However, Twitter is different from Steemit in terms of
the text length.
In this respect, Facebook is a good example to compare
with Steemit. Users of both Steemit and Facebook can write
long articles. (Santia, Mujib, and Williams 2019) tried to
tional cloud service, and only links to the media are included in the
post.
detect social bots on Facebook with six features including
the content-based features. However, they did not extract the
features that represent pairwise text similarity. Rather, they
computed the innovation rate that represents the vocabulary
of each account and also is used on a Twitter dataset (Clark
et al. 2016). In addition, they proposed six features which are
used on a Facebook dataset containing the innovation rate.
Features related with the behavioral regularity also give
important information. (Chu et al. 2012) proposed an auto-
mated account detection algorithm on Twitter, which mea-
sures the entropy of tweeting time intervals. Showing the
difference in the distributions of the entropy for each type
of account, they emphasized that entropy measures are
important for detecting automated accounts. In addition,
(Chavoshi, Hamooni, and Mueen 2017) emphasized that it
is important to consider temporal data to detect twitter bots.
In this regard, we compute entropy from the sequence of the
various activities including transfer of an account.
Other studies have tried to extract various types of fea-
tures. (Dickerson, Kagan, and Subrahmanian 2014) used
sentiment scores to design a social bot classifier by applying
the Random Forest algorithm, using several features includ-
ing the sematic metric. Feature importance extracted from
Random Forest algorithm has revealed that semantic metrics
play an important role in detecting social bots on Twitter.
(Varol et al. 2017) extracted six different types of features:
metadata of users and friends, tweet content and sentiment,
network patterns, and activity time series. They highlighted
the fact that human and bot accounts have diverse behavior
patterns and concluded that 8 - 15 percent of accounts on
Twitter are social bots.
There are different approaches to detect bots on so-
cial media platform. (Cresci et al. 2017; Feng et al. 2017;
Lee and Kim 2014) defined different types of similarities
used to detect social bots. (Cresci et al. 2017) defined the
Digital DNA, which is the sequence of behaviors of a user,
and computed the similarity of two sequences. (Lee and
Kim 2014) considered the similarity of user names. In ad-
dition, (Feng et al. 2017) defined the similarity of users’
relationships. Both applied each similarity to the hierar-
chical clustering method. (Chavoshi, Hamooni, and Mueen
2016) is a model to detect twitter bot based on the cluster-
ing method. They used the lag-sensitive hashing technique
and computed the Pearson correlation of posting time series
between each user. Some applied anomaly detection meth-
ods (Castellini, Poggioni, and Sorbi 2017; Minnich et al.
2017). (Castellini, Poggioni, and Sorbi 2017) extracted fea-
tures and applied them to a denoising autoencoder, a deep
learning algorithm, and (Minnich et al. 2017) employed an
ensemble method of anomaly detection. Some studies are
based on the graph structure (Cao et al. 2012; Wang, Zhang,
and Gong 2017). Their approaches are based on the Ran-
dom Walk (Cao et al. 2012) or Loop Belief Propagation
(Wang, Zhang, and Gong 2017). (Boshmaf et al. 2015; El-
Mawass, Honeine, and Vercouter 2018; Ho¨ner et al. 2017)
mixed machine learning algorithms with graph based meth-
ods. They defined the similarity between users (El-Mawass,
Honeine, and Vercouter 2018) or adjusted each edge weight
using a machine learning method (Boshmaf et al. 2015;
Ho¨ner et al. 2017). For other studies on Steemit, see (Thel-
wall 2018; Casadesus-Masanell, White, and Elterman 2019;
Jeong 2020).
Feature Generation
In the feature generation section, we describe the features
used in the classification. The features are divided into four
categories. First, we develop the CDFA group that describes
the distance between frequently used words and articles.
Second, (Santia, Mujib, and Williams 2019) analyzed the
social bots on Facebook. Unlike Twitter, one can write a
blog post on Facebook with unlimited characters, similar
to Steemit. Therefore, we benchmark the features in (San-
tia, Mujib, and Williams 2019) and call them a Santia-2019
group. Third, (Chu et al. 2012) classified the accounts in
Twitter into human, bot, cyborg using entropy rate, spam
detection, and account properties. However, some of the fea-
tures are not available or not meaningful to detect the post-
ing bots on Steemit. For example, the kind of twitting device
or account verification features are not available on Steemit,
and spam detection is not meaningful because out of four-
teen spammers, only two appear to be posting bots, and the
remaining twelve are humans. Consequently, we benchmark
the entropy rate and some of the account properties from
(Chu et al. 2012), and we denote them as Chu-2012 group.
Finally, we added more features related to blockchain in or-
der to observe a relation between blockchain and posting
bots. We denote them as blockchain-oriented feature group.
In this section, we generate four groups of features. We aim
to study the difference in the effect of posting bot detection
between the features we created and the features in the pre-
vious study (Chu-2012, Santia-2019). Also we want to ob-
serve the difference in performances between features with
and without the blockchain-oriented ones.
CDFA Group
We introduce the new features called the CDFA group to
represent the characteristics of words of a given account.
First, to develop the new features, we introduce a clustering
method that considers a similarity between articles. Cluster-
ing Distance between Frequent words and Articles (CDFA)
is a method that transforms word data into real values. We
consider the frequent words used by an account and mea-
sure the distance between the frequent words and the articles
written by the account.
For the given data of the m articles written by an account,
to extract the frequent words, we split the articles into words
with a space. Let Wj be the set of words in the j-th arti-
cle, W =
⋃
1≤j≤mWj be the set of all words used in the
articles, and wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be the words in W . Further,
for each article, we determine whether a word wi is used or
not. Then we obtain the occurrence vectors Vj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
with the length n in which an element in each vector Vj rep-
resents the word occurrence in the j-th article. We describe
the occurrence vectors as follows:
Vj [i] =
{
1, wi ∈Wj
0, wi /∈Wj .
Next, we sum up the occurrence vectors and obtain a total
occurrence vector T . More precisely, for each element in T ,
the value represents the number of articles where the word
appears. Among the values in T , words having an occur-
rence value of 10% or more of the maximum value in T are
defined as frequent words F and we obtain a vector Vfreq
of length n that has value 1 on the frequent words, and 0
otherwise:
Vfreq[i] =
{
1, wi ∈ F
0, wi /∈ F .
After we determine the vector Vfreq , we compute the Eu-
clidean distance between Vfreq and Vj and define the dis-
tance as dj . For the m distances, we cluster them with the
Dirichlet Process Gaussian Mixture Model introduced in
(Rasmussen 2000). In detail, a maximum number of clusters
is set to five. Note that some of the clusters may not contain
enough data and the clusters are not appropriate to represent
the writing patterns. In this case, we choose the clusters such
that sizes of the clusters are at least m5 , where the denomi-
nator comes from the maximum number of clusters.
Using CDFA, we obtain the clusters of distances. Among
them, we choose a cluster that has the minimum average
of the distances. Because posting bots tend to write articles
with a fixed form, words in the form would be in the frequent
words, and the distances between the frequent words and ar-
ticles with fixed forms would be small. Therefore, we select
the cluster with the minimum average of the distance and
denote the cluster as MAC-CDFA. From the MAC-CDFA,
we extract the mean, variance of the MAC-CDFA, and the
number of clusters that have the size at least m5 .
Figure 1 shows the procedure of CDFA in brief. From the
articles, we extract frequent words and calculate the distance
between the frequent words and articles. After that, we clus-
ter the distances and choose the cluster that has the least
mean among the clusters.
CDFA can be applied to various datasets. For a blog, there
are the title, content, and replies. We applied the CDFA to
the title, content, and replies that are written by an account,
and we denote them as CDFA-T, CDFA-C, and CDFA-R,
respectively. Similarly, we define the MAC-CDFA-T, MAC-
CDFA-C, and MAC-CDFA-R. For each MAC-CDFA, we
extract three features, thus there are nine features from the
CDFA. We call the nine features CDFA feature group (or
simply CDFA features). For accounts with less than five
blogs, the value of mean and variance of MAC-CDFA-T and
MAC-CDFA-C are 0. In addition, the number of clusters via
CDFA-T and CDFA-C are 0. Similarly, for accounts with
less than five replies, the mean and variance of MAC-CDFA-
R and the number of clusters via CDFA-R are 0.
Figure 2 shows distributions of features in the CDFA
group. The top three graphs represent the mean of MAC-
CDFA, three graphs in the middle represent the variance
of MAC-CDFA, and the bottom three graphs represent the
number of clusters via CDFA. To observe meaningful data,
we make histograms using accounts with five or more blogs
for the left six graphs, and accounts with five or more replies
for the right three graphs because the excluded accounts
have the value of 0.
Figure 1: CDFA and MA-CDFA
Index Feature Name
1 Average of MAC-CDFA-T
2 Variance of MAC-CDFA-T
3 Number of clusters in CDFA-T
4 Average of MAC-CDFA-C
5 Variance of MAC-CDFA-C
6 Number of clusters in CDFA-C
7 Average of MAC-CDFA-R
8 Variance of MAC-CDFA-R
9 Number of clusters in CDFA-R
Table 1: Features in CDFA Group
In addition to our features, there are numerous other ones
related to text similarity and natural language processing.
In this section, we will compare the CDFA features with
other text-related features: (i) frequent word counts, (ii) term
frequency–inverse document frequency (TF–IDF), (iii) Lev-
enshtein edit distance, and (iv) word embedding.
We obtained the frequent word count in the CDFA pro-
cess. Concurrently, one of the standard methods to analyze
text content is TF–IDF, which assigns a weight to each word
in a document. In general, in TF–IDF, common words are
allotted low weights, whereas uncommon ones have high
weights. However, TF–IDF does not represent the features
of an account. Assuming that an account frequently uses a
word, whereas other accounts scarcely employ it, then the
TF–IDF weight of this word will be higher than those of the
other words employed in the content written by that account.
However, the TF–IDF weight of a word will be relatively
low if the word was found in other documents. We calcu-
lated the TF–IDF weights of those words occurred for ten
times or more.
The Levenshtein edit distance is one of the standard ap-
proaches to calculate the distance between two texts. Owing
to the long computing time of the model, we sampled the
accounts that wrote less than 500 posts and less than 500
replies. Moreover, for a given account, we divided data into
titles of blogs, content of blogs, and replies, and calculated
the mean of the pairwise distance of each categorized data.
Word embedding is used in natural language processing.
To conduct the word embedding, we collected pre-trained
dataset in English, German, Spanish, Korean, French, and
Russian from Fasttext(Joulin et al. 2016). In the pre-trained
dataset, a word is assigned to a 300-dimensional vector. We
denote the set of words in the pre-trained dataset as a bag of
words. For a given text, we split it into words, and calculate
the average of vectors corresponding with the words which
are in the bag of words. We denote the average of vectors
as a text vector. For each account, we calculate a text vector
for each blog content or replies, obtain an account vector as
the average of the text vectors, and use the account vector
as a feature. We sampled accounts that the number of words
contained in both the bag of words and the words that the
account used is 500 or more.
In Table 2, we compare all the text-related features to the
CDFA features. We used Random Forest classifier with Gini
index in the classification. The left scores in the table are
the F1-scores of the features, and the right scores are the
corresponding F1-scores of the CDFA features. Because an
account set varies, the corresponding scores of the CDFA
features also vary. We observe that the CDFA features out-
perform the other features.
Features Score Score of CDFA
Frequent word counting 62.78 83.72
TF-IDF 79.38 83.72
Levenshtein edit distance 73.01 83.22
Word embedding 59.05 78.14
Table 2: Comparison between text related features and
CDFA
Santia-2019 Group
In the Santia-2019 group, there are six features; average re-
sponse time, average comment length, innovation rate, max-
imum daily comments, number of links and thread deviation.
Average Response Time Steemit users can leave com-
ments on a blog or may leave replies to the comments left
on the blog. Moreover, users can leave replies to the replies.
We introduce a depth of comments to explain this process.
Blogs in Steemit are comments of depth 0. Comments left
on blogs are comments of depth 1. If you leave a reply on a
comment of depth n, then your reply is of depth n+1. Then,
the comment of depth n you left a reply to is the parent reply
to your reply. Response time measures how long each reply
has been created since a previous reply was made. Here, the
previous reply means a reply written just before the reply
among replies whose parent reply is the same. If a reply is
the first among them, we compute the time difference from
the parent reply. Then, we obtain the response time of each
reply. Given a user, average response time is the average of
the response times for all replies written by the user.
Figure 2: Distribution of Features in CDFA group
Average Comment length We generate features related
to blogs and replies. One of them is the average comment
length. Same as (Santia, Mujib, and Williams 2019), some
of the posting bots generate blog content or replies that are
long. We generate the average comment length by averag-
ing lengths of all the blog content and replies written by an
account.
Innovation Rate One of the criteria for identifying hu-
mans and bots is the diversity of words. To measure the di-
versity of words, (Santia, Mujib, and Williams 2019) used
the innovation rate that represents the decay rate of diver-
sity of words. In (Clark et al. 2016), to detect the automa-
tion on Twitter, they used the word introduction decay rate
α(n). In our case, the whole procedure is the same except
the shuffling. Because there are many blogs and replies for
some bots, we shuffled the words based on the articles. That
means, for m articles, we shuffle the order of the articles,
split them with space, and make the sequence of the words.
Further, we shuffle three times to obtain the innovation rate.
Maximum Daily Comments Unlike ordinary accounts,
bots can write many articles in a day using automated pro-
grams. To deal with the bots that generate a massive number
of blogs or replies in a short period, we extract the maximum
daily comments.
Number of Links We use a regular expression to extract
the strings that http or https contain. Even though a regular
expression is used, some strings could not be included in the
URL in the middle, thus a URL validator is used to filter
them out.
Thread deviation This feature represents a regularity in
a user’s response patterns. We compute response times of
all replies left on a blog. Next, we check the average re-
sponse time corresponding to the blog. Then, for each reply
left on the blog, we calculate a difference between the re-
sponse time of the reply and the average response time of
the blog. This difference is called deviation. We calculate
the deviation of replies written by a user. Finally, a thread
deviation of a user is defined as the average of deviation of
replies written by the user.
Index Feature Name
10 Average Response Time
11 Average Comment length
12 Innovation Rate
13 Maximum Daily Comments
14 Number of Links
15 Thread deviation
Table 3: Features in Santia-2019 Group
Chu-2012 Group
In Chu-2012 group, there are six features; entropy rate, hash-
tag ratio, mention ratio, URL ratio, FF ratio and the age of
an account.
Entropy rate The entropy rate H¯(X) is the conditional
entropy of an infinite random process X = {Xi},
H¯(X) = lim
n→∞H(Xn|Xn−1, · · · , X1),
where the conditional entropy is computed as follows:
H(Xn|Xn−1, · · · , X1) =H(X1, X2, · · · , Xn)−
H(X1, X2, · · · , Xn−1),
and an entropy of a sequence of random variables is defined
as
H(X1, · · · , Xn) = −
n∑
i=1
P (Xi = xi) logP (Xi = xi).
Here, we denote the above equation as an entropy formula.
Because real data sets are finite, (Chu et al. 2012) used
a corrected conditional entropy, denoted as CCE, to esti-
mate the entropy rate. First, they derived the joint probabil-
ities, P (X1 = x1, · · · , Xn = xn), empirically. Then, they
computed the conditional entropy based on the empirically
derived joint probability. This conditional entropy is de-
noted by CE. Then, they added corrective terms per(Xn) ·
EN(X1), where per(Cn) is the percentage of unique se-
quences of length n, and EN(X1) is the entropy of X1 as
follows:
CCE(Xn|Xn−1, · · · , X1) =CE(Xn|Xn−1, · · · , X1)+
per(Xn) · EN(X1).
They determined n that minimizes CCE, and also com-
puted the entropy rate of the sequence of tweeting intervals
of each user. We measured the entropy rate of the sequence
of comment time intervals and the time difference between
comment actions.
Account Properties As we mentioned at the beginning of
the feature generation section, some features are available.
In the case of blogs, tag data contains the tags of blogs that
represent the main topic of the blogs. Thus, we use a regular
expression to extract the hashtags. After obtaining the hash-
tags, we calculate the hashtag ratio by dividing the number
of blogs and replies that contain mentions to the number of
blogs and replies. We also extract the mention ratio in a sim-
ilar way to the hashtag ratio. In the case of the URL ratio, we
Index Feature Name
16 Entropy rate
17 Hashtag ratio
18 Mention ratio
19 URL ratio
20 FF ratio
21 The age of an account
Table 4: Features in Chu-2012 Group
calculate it via processed data used to extract the number of
links by using a similar approach to the hashtag ratio.
Next, using the follower and following data, we calculate
the FF ratio. We obtain the FF ratio by dividing the number
of followers by the sum of the number of followers and fol-
lowings. If the number of followers and followings are 0, the
FF ratio is 0. Finally, the age of an account is the difference
between the time the account was created and the time at the
end of the dataset.
Blockchain-Oriented Feature Group
Based on the blockchain system, we added 12 features,
which are listed in Table 5, and term them blockchain-
oriented (or simply blockchain) features. In this section, we
introduce the blockchain features. Number of transfers is the
sum of the transfers; Daily time entropy of transfer is the en-
tropy setting transfers per day as a random variable in the
entropy formula; Transfer activation time is the interval be-
tween the first and last transfer times; Daily transfer is ob-
tained by dividing the number of transfers by the transfer ac-
tivation time; In-degree of transfer of an account is the num-
ber of accounts that transferred to the account; Out-degree
of transfer of an account is the number of accounts that the
account transferred; Entropy of the in-degree accounts of an
account is the entropy setting accounts that are transferred
to the account as a random variable in the entropy formula;
Entropy of the out-degree accounts of an account is the en-
tropy setting accounts that the account transferred as a ran-
dom variable in the entropy formula, and Steem-created ac-
count determines whether the account is created by Steem.
Initially, to obtain average transfer per blog or reply, we
calculate the number of blogs or replies and the number of
transfers on each day. Subsequently, we divide the number
of blogs or replies into the number of transfers on each day
and obtain a feature by taking an average. Average transfer
per blog and Average transfer per reply are obtained simi-
larly.
Posting bot classification
We explain how to classify the posting bots. First, we intro-
duce a dataset. Second, we clarify an annotation process. Fi-
nally, we describe the procedure of classification using sev-
eral classifiers.
Dataset
Steemit is a social media platform based on the Steem
blockchain. The Steem blockchain is a public blockchain;
Figure 3: F1-score comparison
Index Feature Name
22 Number of transfers
23 Daily time entropy of transfer
24 Transfer activation time
25 Daily transfer
26 In-degree of transfer
27 Out-degree of transfer
28 Entropy of the in-degree accounts
29 Entropy of the out-degree accounts
30 Steem-created account
31 Average transfer per blog or reply
32 Average transfer per blog
33 Average transfer per reply
Table 5: Features in the Blockchain-oriented Feature Group
therefore, all the data are publicly available.6 Using the data
from February 2019 to December 2019, we manually classi-
fied humans and bots. A total number of 984 accounts were
divided into 325 bot accounts and 659 human accounts. For
sampling, we collected the users that write blogs or replies
that are 40 times or more. We describe the detailed labeling
process in the annotation section.
Annotation
Because Steem is less explored in previous studies, anno-
tation is one of the challenging tasks in our research. Two
annotators participated in the annotation, which consists of
two stages. In the first stage, both the annotators label the ac-
counts independently using the same dataset. Table 6 sum-
marizes the results of the first stage. Subsequently, in the
second stage, the annotators compare and discuss their la-
bels. Remark that Cohen’s Kappa value is 90.23. Some ac-
counts write several posts or replies like humans, but they
6However, there are some types of data that are not stored on
this blockchain. First, any media (e.g., pictures, videos, etc.) is
stored in a typical centralized cloud service. Second, broadly, cer-
tain activities (e.g., login, logout, and read) that are not publicly
available on steemit.com are not stored on the blockchain.
Annotators Annotator 1Bot Human
Annotator 2 Bot 283 26Human 15 660
Table 6: Annotation in the First Stage. The Cohen’s Kappa
value is 90.23.
are suspicious of using the automated program in some posts
or replies. We denote them as semi-automated accounts. The
annotators analyzed that the Cohen’s Kappa value is high
because the subjective opinions of two annotators coincide
in labeling semi-automated accounts as bots. The annotators
agreed to establish the criteria for labeling to deal with the
semi-automated accounts and consider the disagreement of
4.17% for all the accounts.
Basic criteria for labeling bots were established to be gen-
eral characteristic of a blog and reply data of the accounts,
which are labeled as bots from both the annotators. To set the
basic criteria, we define the form. When multiple texts have
the same form, only the numbers, accounts, and links in the
texts change, and the rest is the same. For example, some
accounts have the form of “You got a [n]% upvote from [ac-
count].” In this case, the changes are only in the number n
and/or the account part. In addition, some accounts have the
form of a table with the ranking of accounts according to
some criteria. In this scenario, changes occur only in the ac-
counts in the table. Second, if an account has several forms
and writes repeatedly using them, the account is labeled as a
bot. For example, when an account runs a gambling app, it is
necessary to set the forms such as the winner, amount won,
amount they can bet on, and remained funds for gambling. In
summary, our basic criterion is that a bot has a certain form
or forms in blogs or replies and writes ten or more times in a
row using the form or forms. If the blog content or replies of
an account match the basic criterion, the account is labeled
as a bot.
However, there are accounts that our basic criterion may
not be adequately applied. Therefore, we establish some ex-
ceptions. An account that satisfies one of the following cases
is labeled as a human: (i) leaving replies to participate in an
event or use a service that a bot cannot participate or use eas-
ily, (ii) writing a link related to a game-play live streaming
and having ten or more replies which do not satisfy the basic
criteria, (iii) reporting one’s workout records using workout
app that has its own abusing detection system, (iv) posting
a personal game app status and having ten or more replies
which do not satisfy the basic criteria, and (v) posting pic-
tures and having ten or more replies which do not satisfy
the basic criteria. In contrast, an account that satisfies one of
the following cases is labeled as a bot: (i) copying news and
having less than ten replies; (ii) randomly rearranging short
sentences.
The created CDFA features focus on text similarity. In the
labeling process, the basic criteria are related to text sim-
ilarity. However, our labeling does not entirely depend on
text similarity. It also considers the opinions or experiences
of users. In addition, the labeling process considers copying
the news or other types of bots that do not depend on text
similarity.
Classification Procedure
For the classification, we used several classifiers. In (San-
tia, Mujib, and Williams 2019) and (Chu et al. 2012), Ran-
dom Forest classifiers with Gini index and Entropy (Breiman
2001), Linear Support Vector classifier (Cortes and Vapnik
1995), and Decision Tree classifier (Breiman 2017) are used
to detect bots. In addition to them, we also used more classi-
fiers based on boosting algorithms such as XGBoost (Chen
and Guestrin 2016), LightGBM (Ke et al. 2017), and Ad-
aBoost (Freund, Schapire, and Abe 1999). Also, we applied
the multi-layer perceptron (MLP) classifier (Windeatt 2006)
as a representative neural network. We denote Random For-
est classifier with Entropy as RF-E, Random Forest classifier
with Gini index as RF-G, Linear Support Vector classifier as
LSVC, XGBoost classifier as XGB, Decision Tree classifier
as DTC, LightGBM as LGBM.
In case of scores, we used the four traditional measure-
ments; Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F1-score.
To generate the results, we performed five-fold cross-
validation. First, we shuffled our dataset and divided it
equally into five sets. Next, we choose the first set as the
test set, with the remainder becoming the training set. In
the training set, we optimized the hyperparameters for each
classification algorithm using a grid search via the five-fold
cross-validation to obtain a high F1-score. Applying the op-
timized hyperparameters to the classification algorithms, we
obtained the models and fit them to the test set and acquired
the results. From the divided sets, we can choose five differ-
ent test sets. Repeating the above procedure, we realized five
different results for each model and obtained the final result
for each model by taking the average.
Results and Discussion
We compare the results obtained by employing the four fea-
ture groups, and observe that the CDFA group outperforms
the other ones. In addition, we derive the results correspond-
ing to the presence and absence of the blockchain features,
to ensure that blockchain-oriented features are effective. To
interpret the results, we consider the feature importance of
each model and rank the features accordingly. For highly
ranked features, we further analyze their characteristics.
Results
Note that we categorized the features into the four feature
groups: CDFA, Santia-2019, Chu-2012 and blockchain fea-
tures. For convenience, Santia-2019 is denoted as S, and
Chu-2012 as C. Table 7 shows the results when only one
of the four feature groups is applied and the results when
blockchain-oriented features are excluded and included. In
Table 7, we highlight the best scores among the four feature
groups for each classifier and the best scores among the clas-
sifiers in the cases of including and excluding blockchain-
oriented features respectively. We observe that the CDFA
group classifies posting bots better than the other feature
groups. In addition, including blockchain-oriented features
is more effective in detecting posting bots except for lin-
ear support vector classifier, decision tree classifier and XG-
Boost classifier. Finally, as we see in Table 7, Random Forest
classifier with entropy gives the best score in Accuracy and
F1-score, Random Forest classifier with Gini index gives
the best score in Precision, and AdaBoost classifier gives
the best score in Recall.
Feature Importance
The tree-based ensemble models (Random Forest, Decision
Tree, XGBoost, LightGBM, AdaBoost) provide the feature
importance. For a tree-based model, the classification is
done based on the features in the data set. Feature impor-
tance provides information on how the features contributed
to improve scores. In the classification procedure, we obtain
six different tables of feature importance from the six clas-
sifiers. Because we calculate the F1-score by averaging the
F1-scores of the five different test sets for each model, we
also calculate the feature importance by averaging the im-
portance of the five different train sets.
Figure 4 shows the results of the top 15 feature importance
of each model. The x axis represents the feature names.
We observe that some of features in the CDFA group have
high importance. As we see in Figure 4, only the qualita-
tive analysis on the feature rank is available due to the scat-
tered graphs. To determine the overall ranking, we consider
the Borda count in (Borda 1784) that is one of the popu-
lar election methods. The Borda count changes the rank of
the relative points and determines the final rank by summing
the relative points. There are many methods that change the
rank of the relative points. In this study, we use the Dowdall
system that calculates the relative points with the recipro-
cal of the rank. For the average of the feature importance
of each model, we determine the rank with respect to the
importance. Furthermore, we get the reciprocal of the ranks
and sum them up. Finally, we obtain the sum of the relative
points of the features and determined the rank. Table 8 shows
the top five features that have relative points higher than 1.
We observe that three of them are in the CDFA group. The
FF ratio and the innovation rate are also in Table 8. We will
analyze the features in Table 8 further in the next section.
Models Scores CDFA Santia-2019 Chu-2012 Blockchain CDFA + S + C All
RF-G
Accuracy 89.63 87.40 87.10 82.42 91.46 92.28
Precision 81.73 78.66 76.23 66.93 83.48 85.12
Recall 85.94 82.25 83.35 77.32 89.81 90.81
F1 83.72 80.31 79.53 71.52 86.44 87.83
RF-E
Accuracy 89.64 87.20 87.20 82.42 91.77 92.68
Precision 82.10 77.74 75.58 67.51 84.50 84.77
Recall 85.75 82.43 84.06 76.85 89.81 92.28
F1 83.83 79.83 79.51 71.70 87.03 88.32
LinearSVC
Accuracy 83.64 57.83 75.31 74.90 64.94 63.83
Precision 67.70 50.45 63.43 58.81 71.08 54.18
Recall 80.56 49.62 65.99 64.29 56.23 56.98
F1 73.22 42.76 61.21 60.59 57.45 49.77
DTC
Accuracy 87.50 85.67 84.96 76.83 87.40 85.67
Precision 76.30 69.73 70.19 60.27 76.54 72.34
Recall 84.33 84.01 81.29 67.76 83.78 82.59
F1 79.99 76.00 75.29 63.04 79.97 76.82
XGBoost
Accuracy 89.64 86.38 87.09 81.40 92.99 91.46
Precision 79.39 75.03 74.05 62.97 85.73 83.32
Recall 88.02 82.57 84.92 76.92 92.36 90.02
F1 83.47 78.36 79.06 69.06 88.88 86.48
LightGBM
Accuracy 89.94 87.09 87.50 81.91 91.36 92.48
Precision 81.60 74.98 75.34 63.89 83.23 84.49
Recall 87.13 83.99 85.09 77.58 89.83 91.92
F1 84.23 79.19 79.88 69.97 86.33 88.02
AdaBoost
Accuracy 87.91 87.10 87.09 81.30 91.36 91.77
Precision 74.12 73.48 73.71 64.79 84.61 81.79
Recall 87.33 85.33 85.17 75.64 88.91 92.50
F1 80.09 78.89 78.94 69.58 86.61 86.70
MLP
Accuracy 85.77 70.93 60.98 70.94 76.93 75.81
Precision 72.60 53.54 22.76 50.54 62.77 63.94
Recall 82.54 60.65 37.01 63.84 70.09 65.19
F1 94.97 54.50 15.40 51.19 63.21 63.74
Table 7: Scores of the Models
Rank Feature Name
1 Variance of MAC-CDFA-R
2 Variance of MAC-CDFA-T
3 Mean of MAC-CDFA-T
4 Innovation Rate
5 FF Ratio
Table 8: Rank of Features (Top 5)
Feature Interpretation
In this section, we check the distributions of important fea-
tures showed in Table 8, and a feature that has the highest
rank among the blockchain features. Top left graph in the
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the mean of MAC-CDFA-
T for active users who post blogs five times or more. The
users in the graph are normally distributed, and the distri-
bution of posting bots has smaller means in the graph. This
shows that posting bots tend to post with some forms in ti-
tles.
The top two histograms in Figure 5 show the log scaled
distributions of variance of MAC-CDFA-R and MAC-
CDFA-T for active users. We see that the variances of
MAC-CDFA-R and MAC-CDFA-T of posting bots are zero
more often than humans. In contrast, the log scaled distribu-
tions for humans resemble the normal distributions. Conse-
quently, we infer that an active user is a posting bot when
the variance of MAC-CDFA-T or MAC-CDFA-R is zero.
(Chu et al. 2012) analyzed that automated bots on Twit-
ter follow numerous users, expecting that humans will fol-
low them in return. However, this scenario is reversed on
Steemit. The lower left graph in Figure 5 presents the distri-
bution of the FF ratio. We observe that FF ratios of various
posting bots are close to 1 each. This suggests that most of
the posting bots do not follow other users. In contrast, hu-
mans follow other users actively.
A user who has a limited vocabulary has a high innovation
rate, whereas a creative user has a low innovation rate. This
is well-illustrated in the lower right in Figure 5. This dis-
tribution displays that users with high innovation rates are
posting bots, whereas those with low innovation rates are
humans.
In contrast, the feature with the highest-ranking among
the blockchain features is the out-degree of transfer, and it
Figure 4: Top 15 feature importance of classifiers
Figure 5: Distributions of important features
is ranked 12th. Analysis of this feature demonstrated that 39
accounts had an out-degree of transfer of more than 200, of
which 92.3% or 36 accounts were bots, and 7.7% or three
accounts were humans. In addition, 11.1% of the bots and
only 0.5 % of the humans had an out-degree of transfer of
more than 200. Observation of these accounts suggests that
they need to transfer tokens to other accounts, such as run-
ning games and events, or manage their tokens within the
Steem blockchain. Therefore, from the out-degree of trans-
fer feature, we infer that it assists in detecting these types of
bots.
Overall, we observed that the behaviors of posting bots
are different from those of humans in numerous aspects.
Based on the CDFA features, we obtain the information of
the texts close to the representative text structure of each
account. In fact, our results demonstrate that using a rep-
resentative text structure is essential to detect posting bots.
Considering the innovation rate, bots produce the same texts
with little variations and have restricted vocabularies. In ad-
dition, we find an extreme distribution of the FF ratio. From
the distribution, we infer that developing a relationship with
other accounts is not a primary objective of posting bots.
Among the blockchain features, the out-degree of trans-
fer is essential in classification, and we detect some bots
that transfer a large amount of cryptocurrencies for running
games or managing their tokens.
Conclusion
The problem of detecting posting bots is one of the essential
issues to avail more rewards to human users and motivate
them to generate good content. In this paper, we developed
features in a CDFA group to detect the posting bots. The
CDFA method is used to find frequent words in articles and
to measure the distance between the frequent words and the
articles. Note that Steemit users can write blogs or replies
without limit of length of words like on Facebook. To an-
alyze the posting bot, it is necessary to deal with a large
number of blogs or replies with unlimited length because
they can generate many articles in a short period of time.
Therefore, we calculate the similarity of articles by trans-
forming the articles into real numbers and using a cluster-
ing method that can deal with many blogs and replies. With
CDFA, we select the MAC-CDFA among the clusters ob-
tained from CDFA and extract features from MAC-CDFA.
To compare the performance of features, we benchmark the
features introduced in (Santia, Mujib, and Williams 2019)
and (Chu et al. 2012), and use the F1-score as a compari-
son measure. The results show that the features in the CDFA
group are more effective than other feature groups. To inter-
pret the results, we calculated the feature importance and its
rank and performed further analysis of feature distribution.
There is a limitation of our research. In our labeling pro-
cess, annotations were rarely proceeded for languages that
the annotators were not familiar with. In the future research,
we expect that new features are developed and detect other
kinds of bots in blockchain-based social media platforms.
For example, bid voting bots receive cryptocurrency and up-
vote posts or replies. Although a list of such bots is avail-
able, detecting such bots systematically and using them to
improve posting bot detection quality would be of interest.
Also, we will be able to improve the results by developing
customized CDFA features for each language. Finally, we
expect that the CDFA features will be used to detect posting
bots on social media platforms other than Steemit.
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